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RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

A FORERUNNER OF THE MODERN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.¹

IN these days, when the psychology of religion is heralded as a new thing, it is interesting to be reminded that for thirty years preceding his death in 1900 Dr. Everett gave his students a regular and systematic course of about thirty lectures on this subject. The fact is significant in various ways. It not only shows recognition of the strategic position of the psychology of religion in theological thought; it also reveals a connecting link between an older and a newer mode of handling the same facts.

The older mode of approach to the psychological facts of religion had two stages. Observation of these facts, or of some of them, is as old as reflection upon religion. Dreams, hallucinations, and the various automatic states that have been interpreted as inspirations, were an important part of the data for early mythical and theological theories. From the beginning until now men have reasoned that here, in this or that mental phenomenon, divinity touches our life. Skeptics met this mode of thought upon its own ground. Lucretius quoted with approval the saying of Petronius that fear made the gods, and Hume, in his *Natural History of Religion*, tried to show that belief in gods arises and develops through certain qualities of human nature rather than through mere reason or insight. But not until Schleiermacher wrote his glowing *Reden* did the psychological point of view come to clear consciousness as a principle of method. Up to the end of the eighteenth century the concept of religion was got at through the idea of God; but Schleiermacher compelled us to approach the idea of God through the fact of religion, and to study religion in the inner experience of it. As far as impulse and point of view are concerned, Schleiermacher may be regarded as the founder of the psychology of religion. But his analysis was incomplete, and the methods of modern psychology were yet to be developed.

These methods were still undeveloped when Dr. Everett's courses

¹ *The Psychological Elements of Religious Faith.* By CHARLES CARROLL EVERETT. Edited by EDWARD HALE. New York: Macmillan, 1902. xiii + 215 pages. \$1.50.

of instruction were fully organized. Accordingly, the volume now before us is not at all a product of the recent movement toward an empirical psychology of religion. There is here no hint of the psychophysical point of view, or of the genetic method which, tracing the growth of the child-mind, and correlating it with the development of the race-mind, is yielding such rich returns. Neither are the range and the variations of the religious consciousness in view, but only such typical facts as one can deal with without leaving the study chair. The biological and sociological problems with which the psychology of today is so deeply concerned have not yet emerged, and the method, as we shall see, reveals no sign of the present conflict between the structural and the functional conceptions of mind. The scope of the lectures is determined by a theological rather than psychological interest, namely, the logic of faith. In fact, the course was formerly given under the title "The Psychological Basis of Religious Faith." Naturally enough, no sharp distinction is made between the principles of metaphysics and facts ascertained by observation.

Nevertheless, the work occupies a mediating position between Schleiermacher and the empirical psychology of the present. It points out that, while Schleiermacher's definition of religion is apparently psychological, it is really dogmatic. "Schleiermacher gives no evidence that he has studied religious life in its various manifestations. . . . He has reasoned *to* feeling and not *from* it" (p. 75). If he had begun by studying the religions of the world he would have found in religion something besides the sense of dependence. Though Dr. Everett is strongly under the influence of Schleiermacher, on the one hand, and of Hegel, on the other, his intentional effort is to supplement the observation of the one and to bring the logic of the other into wholesome relations to empirical fact.

The line of thought is, in brief, as follows: First of all, it is maintained that feeling has the primacy in religion, both psychologically and historically. It is the essential thing, just as a grape vine is the essential source of grapes, though soil, air, and water are a *sine qua non*. A first preliminary definition of religion results: "Religion is feeling, or essentially feeling." What kind of feeling, then, is it that constitutes religion? Looking at very early religion for a reply, the author answers: "The feeling toward the supernatural," that is, toward anything that produces an effect apart from the means usually employed. But the notion of the supernatural has many sides, and it develops. Nature, as contrasted with the supernatural, comes to mean the uni-

verse considered as a composite whole, while the supernatural is that which stands in antithesis thereto, either as something apart from it or as the unitary reality through which the elements of the composite have their being. The feeling toward the supernatural may be negative (the result of apparent interference, whether physical or moral) or positive; and the positive feelings fall into three groups—the self-centered (as conciliation), those with divided center (as dread), and the God-centered (as love and worship).

In the last group there is implied a positive content in the notion of the supernatural, a content which is summed up in the old conception of the three ideas of the reason—the true, the beautiful, and the good. These ideas of the reason now become identified with the notion of the supernatural, and so the definition of religion advances to this final form: “A feeling toward a supernatural presence manifesting itself in truth, goodness, and beauty.” The first and second definitions were inclusive of all religions; the last is only typical, that is, expressive of the type toward which religion, in its higher developments, tends to conform. By “reason” is meant the structural elements of intelligence which underlie experience and make it possible. These are conceived as instinctive tendencies to action, and at the same time as involving logical implications. All our intelligent acts assume the unity of the world, even in advance of all reflection upon the point, and this unity is synonymous with truth. Unity, moreover, is fundamental to goodness, which expresses the unity of a man with his fellows, and to beauty, which is unity in nature and between nature and the mind that contemplates it.

From this brief outline it will be seen that structural analysis of the human mind yields at once a definition of religion as a subjective fact, a definition of the kind of object toward which religion moves, and a basis for certainty of its objective truth. We have here, in fact, an interesting application of a Hegelian idea that has become fruitful in the philosophy of religion—the idea that the structure of our rational consciousness is such that, in order to think at all, we must, implicitly if not explicitly, assert the existence of absolute thought or God. This is the successor of the old ontological argument; but, instead of saying that the idea of God implies the divine existence, it asserts that all thinking whatever has this implication.

This is the outcome; and yet the lectures started with the proposition that feeling is the primary and essential fact of religion. The effort to reconcile these two apparently opposed views constitutes, as I

conceive, the most original and significant feature of the volume. On the one hand, religion is feeling; on the other, "goodness and beauty are really manifestations of truth, so that ultimately we have this one innate idea, the first idea of the reason" (p. 149). From this it follows, or appears to, that the ultimate in religion is the concept, as Hegel claimed. If the final definition of religion is "a feeling toward a supernatural presence manifesting itself in truth, goodness, and beauty" (p. 208), and if goodness and beauty are manifestations of truth, it follows that the recognition of truth as truth, or what Hegel called thinking the concept in the form of the concept, is the basal and ultimate fact.

But Dr. Everett certainly did not mean just this. He was too sympathetic toward Schleiermacher for that. In fact, the whole treatment of the subject might be viewed as an effort to mediate between Hegel and Schleiermacher, and of the presence of these two tendencies in his thought the author was fully conscious. At the outset, it is true, he does not qualify the proposition that feeling is the essential thing in religion and, indeed, in the whole conscious life of man. "Intellect represents the environment, feeling represents the man. Intellect brings to man his material; feeling is his response to this material. Intellect is analytic; feeling recognizes the unity of the object and is constructive." (P. 20.) Late in the discussion, however, he remarks: "When I spoke of the primacy of feeling, I had in mind its primacy in manifestation rather than in fact. Behind feeling there exists something which manifests itself in feeling, and this inner self is the instinctive self." (P. 141.) Again, he says that the ideas of truth (or unity), goodness, and beauty come to us through instinct (pp. 148 f.). Moreover, the synthetic function at first attributed to feeling is later transferred to thought, which is made "the primary response of man to his environment" (p. 153). Accordingly, feeling, thought, and instinctive tendency are all declared to be, in some sense, ultimate, but instinct is the conception upon which the author's thought appears finally to rest. "Instinct" is here both the reason that is back of all reasoning and the impulse whence feeling flows, and these two are therefore one at their root. Religion, then, is not any specific feeling co-ordinate with other feelings, or any intellectual perception co-ordinate with other products of intelligence, but rather the central impulse of intelligence itself and of feelings that are adumbrations of intelligence.

The history of religion, accordingly, is really the history of how

men gradually came to consciousness of the theistic idea that is implied in our intelligence. At first, this transcendental element, or the supernatural, was thought to consist of capricious beings like the worshiper himself; the unexpected or unusual was the sign of divinity. Later the supernatural was discovered to be the inner side, the real unity and transcendent source of composite nature. Morals and the æsthetic sense grew up at first with no conscious relation to the supernatural. But the relation is there, and when men become conscious of it, goodness and beauty are taken up into the idea of religion. Religion thus acquires three different senses: it is either what the worshiper intends or understands to be related to the supernatural; or in addition the supernatural implicit in rational functions which are not recognized as religious; or, finally, the actual or metaphysical relation of man to God. All three of these meanings are present, at one point or another, in Dr. Everett's discussion, and his effort is, apparently, to achieve a single conception of religion that shall include them all.

Even this meager hint is sufficient, I trust, to indicate something of the depth and many-sidedness of the book. But the book is only an imperfect reflection of these qualities as they shone in the classroom. For Dr. Everett left no manuscript of his theological lectures, and the volume now before us has been compiled by collating the notebooks of several former pupils. This task has been done faithfully and lovingly. Professor Hale has succeeded in reconstructing the lectures so as to present their substance in a connected and coherent manner. But the personal touches and the elaboration of detail that rarely, if ever, get into student notebooks, are necessarily lacking. The difference, for example, between Dr. Everett's essay on "Reason in Religion" (*Essays, Theological and Literary*, Boston, 1902) and the parallel discussion in the volume before us awakens keen regret that we are deprived of the author's complete statement.

For this reason, if for no other, a reviewer should hesitate to examine too critically the details of the treatment. It is practically certain that every illuminating idea is the author's, while the onesidednesses are likely to come from the refracting media. It would be easy to make a considerable catalogue of passages that display the finest insight. The chapter on the relation between beauty and religion, for example, is a piece of exquisite observation and interpretation. What Martineau did in the religious interpretation of the moral nature is here done in the religious interpretation of the æsthetic experience.

The sense of beauty is a "sense of companionship with the outer world, the sympathetic enjoyment of its perfection." This implies a unity in nature and between nature and the soul that answers to the notion of the supernatural. Beauty does more than suggest such speculative ideas, too, for in the experience of it there may be directly involved a sense of the divine presence.

Dr. Everett's method is that of structural analysis. Mental states are brought before us as though they were inert, much as bales of merchandise might be opened and the contents spread out before our eyes. At the best this method yields only a morphology or an anatomy of mind; the physiology of its processes escapes us. We miss the pulsation of life and the interplay with environment. One of the new contributions of modern psychology is the effort to catch mental states in the making, and to behold in them processes rather than static facts. This, in a general way, is what is meant by functional as distinguished from structural psychology. Structural psychology looks for the elements of mental states; functional psychology views these states as stages in the acceleration or retardation of a vital process. Each method may lead in either of two directions. Structural analysis, examining the logical phases of consciousness, finds the idea of God implicitly present; or, taking the direction that Locke gave it, such analysis may conclude that the entire mental structure is built out of sensations or other simple elements. On the other hand, functional psychology, recognizing the fact of a mental dynamic, may lead up to the question of the mental agent and its basal impulses; or, relating itself to biology, it may view mental processes as mere subjective shadows of the general organic evolution.

It is significant that Dr. Everett's analysis finally leads him to a dynamic and functional conception, namely, instinct (which as the new *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* shows, should in this case be called impulse). Similarly, the old structural notion of "innate ideas" really means with him something more like a functional "*a priori* principle." The outcome, then, is an attempted unification of the logical and psychological points of view in religion. The basal fact of the human mind is impulse; the specifically human impulses include the impulse to think as well as to feel and act; the impulse to think implies the existence of a universal mind; consequently religion is both impulsive and rational; but man comes to full consciousness of this fact of his nature only gradually, and herein lies the history of

religion. Dr. Everett does not attempt to trace the psychological process whereby the religious impulse comes to full self-consciousness in the individual or in the race. In fact, this constitutes one of the chief unfulfilled tasks of the psychology of religion.

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TRADITIONAL CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC.¹

PROFESSOR FISHER'S work, in the form in which it originally appeared in 1883, is doubtless familiar to most of the readers of the JOURNAL. The respected author has felt himself obligated to put his material in a form "more consonant" with what he would "wish to say at present." As a result the edition before us records considerable changes. Some of the chapters have been thrown into the shape of lengthened notes at the end of the volume, new notes have been added, and a considerable part of the text has been rewritten in the light of increased knowledge and with a view to more recent speculation and research. In particular it will be found that the relations of Christian theism to the theory of evolution, the synoptic problem, and the authorship of the fourth gospel are handled more fully, advantage being taken as regards the two latter points of the results of recent German and English scholarship. There is no change, however, in fundamental attitude between the old and the new editions. That attitude may be described as distinctly conservative, though not of course, bigotedly or offensively so. To a large extent Dr. Fisher's standpoint on critical questions does not differ widely from that of Professor Sanday, to whom he dedicates his book "and whose writings," he justly observes, "are an example to contemporary scholars of thorough investigation and faultless candor." As to the general question, Dr. Fisher sees in Christianity the final and absolute religion, "not to be classified with other religions as if it were defective in the sense of containing error or as if it stood in need of a complement to be expected or required in the present stage of human life" (p. 372). This remark is the keynote of the volume. He seeks to show that Christianity is the alone true and valid revelation from God.

The qualities which Dr. Fisher brings to his task are worthy of all honor. Breadth of view, substantial learning, catholicity of temper,

¹ *The Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief*. By G. P. FISHER. New edition. New York: Scribner, 1902 xx + 460 pages. \$2.50.